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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the decision of food companies to realize innovations through in-house ac-
tivities, outsourcing and suing collaborations. The paper uses information from a dataset of 389 
Italian food companies collected by Unicredit group in 2007. We develop a set of hypotheses 
from three theoretical perspectives: transaction cost economics, strategic management and re-
source-based view. This paper aims at highlighting what firm’s features are related to the make, 
buy and mixed innovation-sourcing decisions. We found that these strategies are positively inter-
linked which is challenging current theories. We conclude the paper by discussing these results 
and bringing some interesting outcomes to discuss managerial implications and/or policy inter-
ventions in this highly strategic domain. 
 
Keywords: Making or buying decisions, innovation sourcing strategy, innovation, food industry. 
 
 
Corresponding author:  Tel: + 31.0317482572 
Email:  stefano.pascucci@wur.nl  
A.Royer: annie.royer@eac.ulaval.ca    J. Bijman: jos.bijman@wur.nl    
                                                          
+The IFAMR is a non-profit publication. The additional support provided from this issue advertisers, Novus  
International and GlobalGap help keep us open access and dedicated to serving management, scholars, and policy 
makers worldwide. 
Pascucci et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 15, Issue 3, 2012 
 2012 International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IFAMA). All rights reserved. 
 
 
100 
Introduction 
 
Managers and practitioners evolving in the food industry know that innovation is a key-issue for 
their company success (Rama 2008). Innovations keep consumers aware of product attributes, 
create market segmentation and quality-premium opportunities, and increase knowledge and ca-
pabilities within the organization (Traill and Meulenberg 2002; Omta and Folstar 2005; Pascucci 
et al. 2011). However only a minority of food companies dare to innovate, and if they do, prefer 
to combine in-house and outsourced projects, for example through collaboration with other com-
panies or knowledge institutions and simultaneously buying technology on the market. Why? A 
reason frequently mentioned is that in the food industry, innovation processes are becoming 
more and more complex, maybe even more than other sectors (Rama 2008; Capitanio et al. 2010; 
Enzing et al. 2011). This is explained by the so-called uniqueness of food innovation processes: 
companies dealing with innovative projects are squeezed by technology-push and demand-pull 
forces simultaneously (Grunert et al. 1997; Rama 2008). On the one hand, an almost continuous 
technological development (i.e. in the ICT domain) compels food companies to continuously 
adopt new technologies, restructuring and updating their activities and related capabilities. On 
the other hand, retailers impose strict quality standards and requirements on food companies, 
with low returns and high risks. On top of that, raw materials (agricultural products) are becom-
ing increasingly expensive, or complex to source worldwide. Therefore food companies’ deci-
sions on whether and how to innovate are gaining more and more importance over time.  
 
Despite the recognized relevance of this topic, the literature on innovation sourcing strategy has 
not yet been very prolific in the food sector (Pascucci et al. 2011). One of the main persistent is-
sue in food innovation is that new food products generally have a relatively low success rates 
(Stewart-Knox and Mitchell 2003; Enzing et al. 2011). Notwithstanding this phenomenon, it is 
still unclear why so many European food companies do not show significant efforts in innovative 
investments and R&D activities (Rama 2008).  
 
However, if factors affecting the decisions of food companies to innovate and how to innovate 
could be better understood, more effective policy actions and managerial strategies could then be 
undertaken. In this paper, we propose a first step to address this issue, and to cover this gap.  
 
Looking back at the literature on the organization and management of innovation processes, de-
cisions to innovate “in-house”, to “collaborate” or to “outsource” are considered as an important 
aspect of companies’ strategies (Becheikh et al. 2006; Cassiman and Veugelers 2006). Previous 
studies investigating the decisions of manufacturing companies to make or buy innovations have 
been mainly supportive of both the transaction costs theory (Williamson 2000; 2002) and the 
property rights approach developed by Grossman, Hart and Moore (Grossman and Hart 1986; 
Hart and Moore 1990; Klein 2005). In these studies making or buying decisions are often seen as 
substitute rather than complement.  
 
However, other works from different theoretical perspectives have brought new elements rele-
vant to these analyses. These elements relate to strategic management (Ahuja and Katila 2001) 
knowledge, capabilities and resource-based elements, and the contextual environment (Becheikh 
et al. 2006; Noteboom 2004). They suggest more complementarity between making and buying 
decisions.  
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Although better known, the mechanisms leading to outsourcing versus realizing in-house innova-
tive investments and\or R&D activities are still far from completely understood. For instance, the 
literature looking at the role of dynamic capabilities such as absorptive capacity and learning 
processes within company networks, suggests that a strict dichotomy of “making or buying” no 
longer holds (Zahra and George 2002; Nooteboom 2004). A company innovates in-house if it is 
able to develop internal competences, for example through R&D investments, but at the same 
time might well develop and maintain external ties for example with research organizations, 
while organizing and investing in collaborative networks. Therefore, instead of conceptualizing 
the “make or buy” decisions as opposite alternatives, scholars should better look at them as po-
tentially complement. Moreover, “mixed” decisions can be undertaken such as investing in col-
laborative networks based on R&D and learning activities, which imply both making and buying.  
We can conceptualize this type of organizations as hybrid forms of innovation.  
 
This paper is concerned with this specific issue. It analyses the determinants of the make, buy 
and collaborative (hybrid) decisions in the food industry using a database collected by Unicredit 
group in 2007 that relates to 389 companies operating in the Italian food industry (fruits, vegeta-
bles, vegetal oil, wine and dairy). Following a previous approach developed in Pascucci et al. 
(2011), we have organized the analysis in two steps:  in the first one, we formulate hypotheses on 
the relationship between food companies and their innovation sourcing strategies. In the second 
step, we use a multi-variate probit model (MVP) to test the correlation between “making”, “buy-
ing” and “collaborative” decisions, and we highlight the main driving factors of innovation 
sourcing strategies in the Italian food sector. Our results show that in-house, outsourcing and us-
ing hybrid forms of innovative collaboration are correlated and interlinked decisions, while a 
clear-cut behaviour between food companies that make and the ones that buy innovations cannot 
be draw based on our empirical evidence.  
 
This paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we introduce the concept of innovation as used in 
this paper and we elaborate on the theoretical elements used to develop our hypotheses. In sec-
tion 3, we present our empirical analysis with a first glance at some descriptive statistics before 
introducing our empirical model. Section 4 shows the results while in section 5 we discuss and 
conclude with policy and managerial implications. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
Innovation in the Food Sector 
 
Though similar to other manufacturing sectors, innovation processes in the food sector are condi-
tioned by a relatively higher degree of uncertainty. This is due to the key role played by bio-
based products. Bio-based products have a greater fluctuating quality than manufactured prod-
ucts, due to the perishable nature of agricultural products and the unpredictable weather condi-
tions affecting the quantity and quality of products (Pascucci et al. 2011). Food companies have 
often to deal with very heterogeneous farmers/suppliers. These features of the food sector add to 
the existing uncertainty of the innovative activities (Pascucci et al. 2011). Moreover, new food 
products have generally a relatively low success rates (Grunert et al. 1997; Enzing et al. 2011). 
Finally, innovation outsourcing has a greater importance within the food industry, where R&D 
intensity could be a non-exhaustive indicator to catch the innovativeness (Galizzi and Venturini 
2008).  
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The decision to outsource innovative activities or R&D has to take into account a number of pe-
culiarities that lie in the distinctive nature of innovation compared to other goods or activities 
(Howells et al. 2008). Howells et al. (2008: 206) have made an exhaustive inventory of these pe-
culiarities. First, the outcome of the outsourced innovation is highly uncertain and risky com-
pared to other activities (Doctor et al. 2001). As mentioned by Veugelers and Cassiman (1999), 
given their uncertain returns and short life cycles, investments in risky sunk R&D expenditures 
have taken an overriding importance in the survival of companies. Second, the firm outsourcing 
cannot evaluate the quality of the knowledge that is transferred to them by the supplier (Howells 
et al. 2008). Third, the fact that the supplier of an innovation often does not know the quality of 
the knowledge it sells, because it does not know the future outcomes of its innovation, may lead 
to contractual incompleteness problem related to intellectual property exchange (Howells et al. 
2008). Fourth, both partners, the firm and the customer, are involved in a co-joint production of 
new knowledge which may lead to intellectual property rights rent-sharing issues (Howells et al. 
2008). Fifth, innovation outsourcing may lead to a whole set of moral hazard problems such as 
the use of the knowledge transferred to the supplier for other customers (Howells et al. 2008). 
Sixth, if outsourcing goes wrong, the future of the firm can be threatened given the importance of 
R&D and innovation as core competences and capabilities of companies (Howells et al. 2008). 
Seventh, outsourcing decisions have an irreversible effect on R&D or technical capacity of the 
firm (Howells et al. 2008). Eighth, the exchange of information during the outsourcing process is 
a unique event, which limits the capacity of companies to learn from experience (Howells et al. 
2008). Ninth, tacit nature of the know-how exchanged when outsourcing makes it difficult to 
monitor contracts (Howells et al. 2008). These characteristics are not unique to innovation per 
se, other outsourced activities also show these features, but their combination surely is.  
 
 
Determinants of the Make or Buy Decision 
 
The make or buy decision applied to a company innovation sourcing strategy is receiving in-
creasing attention in the literature. Outsourcing innovation allows companies to tap into ad-
vanced knowledge and technology, as well as to obtain a cost advantage (Ulset 1996; 
Gooroochurn and Hanley 2007). The downside of these advantages, especially when outsourcing 
innovation, is that control loss, maladaptation, technology leakages and hold-up
1
 situations may 
incur costs. Many works looking at the make or buy issue have been performed in the last fifteen 
years in various industries: Ulset (1996) on Norwegian information technology industry; Veuge-
lers and Cassiman (1999) on the Belgium manufacturing industry; Love and Roper (2001); Rop-
er and Love (2002) on UK manufacturing plants; Love and Roper (2005); Howells et al. (2008) 
on UK pharmaceuticals; Gooroochurn and Hanley (2007) on UK companies. Although the trans-
action cost theory has proved to be quite successful in explaining the decision of companies to 
make in-house or to outsource activities, the relevance of this theoretical framework seems to be 
limited when it comes to explain innovation sourcing strategies.  
 
A number of authors have argued that companies faced with the decision to innovate in-house or 
to outsource are more motivated by strategies (Gooroochurn and Hanley 2007; Howells et al. 
2008) or resources (Conner and Prahalad 1996; Love and Roper 2005; Nooteboom 2004) rather 
                                                          
1
 A hold-up is a term used to describe a situation in which one of the partner to a transaction uses its bargaining 
power opportunistically to extract rents from another partner ‘s specific investments.  
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than transaction costs considerations. When investigating the determinants of the make or buy 
decision applied to innovation outsourcing, transaction costs but also competence/resource-based 
approaches and strategic reasons must be taken into account. Based on these considerations, we 
decided to rely on the three theoretical approaches aforementioned (transaction cost economics, 
strategic management and resource-based view). In this section, we review the literature on the 
make or buy innovation determinants drawn from these three perspectives and develop hypothe-
sis to be tested. 
 
Transaction Cost Economics 
 
Transaction costs economics makes the assumption that efficient production requires specific 
investments that will enable companies to reduce production costs, innovate and meet customers’ 
requirements. However, these specific investments create a bilateral dependency that may lead to 
hold-up hazards. As a matter of fact, because these specific investments have a lower value in 
alternative uses, partners to an exchange with such investments may act opportunistically to ap-
propriate the quasi-rent created by them through post-contractual bargaining or threats of termi-
nation, creating transaction costs. In order to minimise transaction costs, contractual partners will 
either seek to develop safeguards such as stronger administrative control rights and more exclu-
sive property rights, or to internalise the transaction, that is to make in-house. Transaction costs 
economics thus argues that companies incurring heavy sunk costs in R&D expenditures will 
want to protect these investments from opportunistic behaviour by innovating in-house 
(Gooroochurn and Hanley 2007). Thus, the following hypothesis is formulated. 
 
Hypothesis 1. Companies having high investment costs in R&D will more likely undertake in-
house innovation sourcing.  
 
Another factor that can influence a firm to outsource innovation activities is related to the nature 
of the other contracting activities of the firm, such as network relations (Becheikh et al. 2006). 
These include the linkages between the food firm and other agents of the food chains (agricul-
ture, distribution operators, etc.) and deal with the attitude to enter in formal and/or relational 
networks (consortia, production-based association, manufacturing joint-ventures, informal con-
tracts, etc.). These linkages allow companies to share information and “know-how”, reduce con-
tractual uncertainty and have access to group resource (Teece 1996). According to transaction 
costs economics, companies involved in a network experience lower transaction costs. Since our 
database contains data on being part of a holding/group and participating in a consortium, we 
make the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Companies that are part of a holding/group or a consortium are more likely to out-
source and/or use hybrids.  
 
Strategic Management 
 
As mentioned previously, outsourcing innovation is particular compared to other activity out-
sourcing since there is a potentiality for R&D findings to be disclosed by the research partner or 
subcontractor (Becheikh et al. 2006). Rents from investments in innovation might then be dissi-
pated. In this section, we draw three hypotheses that take into account companies’ strategic con-
cerns when deciding to make or buy innovation. 
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One of the strategic factors cited in the literature that might influence the make or buy decision 
concerns the market structure. In order to protect their market positions, companies in concen-
trated markets will have an incentive to innovate in-house so as to reduce the risk of disclosure 
and to prevent or delay rivals’ imitations (Love and Roper 2001; Smolny 2003). In a study on the 
Dutch manufacturing sector, Hertog and Thurik (1993, 283) mention “Internal R&D may give a 
firm a valuable lead time over its rivals in a concentrated market.” Their empirical results show 
that a high level of market concentration in a sector is correlated with a relatively low incidence 
of R&D outsourcing. Given these evidences, we pose the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 3. Companies evolving in high market concentration will be more inclined to make 
innovation in-house. 
 
The role of company size, the capacity to allocate financial resources to internal R&D is another 
relevant factor considered in the literature (Beneito. 2003; Greve. 2003; Becheikh et al. 2006). In 
this sense, large companies with strong market power show higher investments in innovation ac-
tivities than the small ones, for example due to larger cash flow generated by monopolistic pow-
er, and to a better access to capital market (Arundel and Kabla 1998; Acs and Audretsch 1998; 
Bougrain and Haudeville 2002; Beneito 2003). However, other authors deeply contested this 
point of view, according to the idea that small and medium companies (SMEs) are more adapta-
ble to the market conditions, more open to “innovation joint-venture” and “contracting strate-
gies” (“buying” innovation activities) (Omta 2002; 2004) and less constrained by the transaction 
costs of bureaucratic and managerial structures (Teece 1996; Teece at al. 1997; Becheikh et al. 
2006). Moreover, SMEs show a higher internal flexibility (related to the organization of the pro-
duction and to decision making processes), a better flow of internal communication, greater spe-
cialisation possibilities, as well as a higher informal and strategic control (Galende and de la 
Fuente 2003). Since the relationship between size and sourcing strategy is ambiguous, we de-
rived this general hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 4. Large companies are more likely to adopt an in-house innovation strategy. 
 
Veugelers and Cassiman (1999) have noticed that process and generic product innovations are 
more likely to be outsourced than product and specialized innovations. Since product innovation 
is considered as a firm-specific input, leakage through outsourcing has more important strategic 
implications than for generic process innovations. The supplier firm cannot use leakage over ge-
neric R&D innovations opportunistically since most companies are contracting these innova-
tions. Therefore, similar to Gooroochurn and Hanley (2007), we make the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 5. Process innovation is more likely to be outsourced, or realized through hybrids 
than product innovation. 
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Resource-Based View 
 
Approaches based on resources claim that we need to incorporate capabilities and competences 
in governance analysis since they have an impact on the efficiency of alternative governance 
structures (Teece 2007; 2009; Nooteboom 2004). There are two complementary competence ex-
planations for innovation sourcing choice. One assumes opportunism as a basic characteristic of 
human behaviour. As innovation involves activities that are often difficult to measure, it provides 
options for opportunistic behaviour. The choice of a governance structure has thus to be made so 
as to reduce the risk of opportunism. The second perspective focuses on the problem of limited 
cognition. It is often impossible to transfer (tacit) knowledge to other persons. By bringing the 
different persons working on an innovation within the boundaries of the firm, knowledge sharing 
is facilitated. Mason and Wagner (1994) have stressed the importance of highly skilled employ-
ees for innovation but the effect of these capabilities on the make or buy strategy is far from be-
ing unanimous. Some scholars argue that high internal competences may be an incentive for 
companies to innovate in-house with available resources and thus benefit from scale of operation 
(Veugelers and Cassiman 1999; Romijn and Albaladejo 2002). Others mention that in-house and 
external activities are complementary, in the sense that in-house capabilities allow companies to 
absorb external knowledge effectively (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Cohen 1995). Aurora and 
Gambardella (1994) have argued that internal knowledge resources support using foreign know-
how more effectively in the firm, which would stimulate external innovation sourcing. Since the 
effect of internal capabilities on innovation sourcing decision is not unanimous in the literature, 
we pose the following hypothesis using the percentage of employees dedicated to R&D activities 
as a proxy for internal resources in innovation.  
 
Hypothesis 6. Companies with a high percentage of employees dedicated to R&D activities are 
more likely to innovate in-house.  
 
The level of human quality also influences the innovation sourcing strategy of companies 
(Becheikh et al. 2006). The way the firm acts in order to facilitate the cumulative learning can be 
assessed by the rate of economic and financial resources dedicated and oriented to the profes-
sional formation and its organisation inside the firm (Romijn and Albaladejo 2002). 
 
Hypothesis 7. Companies with a higher concentration of skilled workers are more likely to inno-
vate in-house and/or using hybrids.  
 
 
Control Variables 
 
Contracting activities can be analysed in an indirect way, looking at the results of their influence 
on the firm strategies on the markets, such as internationalisation and export-orientation (Romijn 
and Albaladejo 2002), the degree of specialization (Hitt and Hoskisson 1988; Beneito 2003; 
Galende and de la Fuente 2003). The empirical literature shows a positive relationship between 
export orientation and innovations (Kumar and Saqib 1996; Roper and Love 2002; Beneito 2003; 
Galende and de la Fuente 2003), while the way product-diversification or specialisation affect 
firm innovation is not clearly recognized and remain still controversial (Chen 1996; Beneito 
2003; Galende and de la Fuente 2003). Since export activities might have an important effect on 
the decision to innovate, we use it as a control variable in our model.  
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The age of the firm and type of ownership (for example being a cooperative or an investor-
owned firm) can be used as another possible measure of its organisational complexity, potential-
ly representing the experience and the knowledge accumulated throughout its history and the 
“learning” process of the firm (Galende and de la Fuente 2003; Pascucci et al. 2011). Some arti-
cles showed the higher inclination to innovate by “old” companies (Kuemmerle 1998; Freel 
2003), while some other considered “young” enterprises as more active in the direction of inno-
vation (Molero and Buesa 1996). In this sense, the age remains a controversial factor of innova-
tion.  
 
Other factors which might be relevant for sourcing decisions refer to the level of modernization 
of the company, for example, considering ICT investments, and ownership structure (i.e. being a 
cooperative or an investor-owned company) (Becheikh et al. 2006). Moreover, sourcing deci-
sions are influenced by the context in which the firm operates. In other words, the geographical 
location and local networking of food companies are key factors behind different attitudes to in-
novativeness (Omta et al. 2001; Nielsen 2008). The specific location of a firm is important to 
understand the opportunities to use local social capital and the institutional environment as a 
source of knowledge and innovativeness (Becheikh et al. 2006; Capitanio et al. 2009; 2010).  
 
Testing the Hypotheses for “Making-Buying” Decisions  
 
Data and Descriptive Analysis 
 
The database used in this paper comes from the 10
th 
survey on Italian manufacturing companies 
carried out by Unicredit Group in 2007. It includes a sample of 389 food companies with infor-
mation related to the period 2004-2006. Data include financial and economic characteristics, or-
ganization, investments, internationalization and innovation processes. The dataset distinguishes 
between internal, external sourcing and use of networks of collaboration and joint ventures for 
carrying out innovation activities. The set allows us to define the three dependent variables of 
our analysis as follow: 
 
(1) “in-house innovation” refers to the presence of R&D activities carried out within the 
company, due to the presence of a specific department or division. We also take into 
account the presence of training activities for the employees of the company with the 
specific purpose of increasing the firm innovation capacities.  
(2) “out-sourcing innovation” is whenever the company indicates that it acquired technolo-
gies, industrial equipment, machineries, patents and/or know-how from other compa-
nies with the specific purpose of introducing new processes and/or products 
(3) “hybrids” relates to R&D activities carried out together with external entities through 
networks of collaboration, strategic alliances or joint ventures, for example with 
knowledge institutes, universities and research centres, or other companies.  
 
One quarter of the sampled companies indicated being involved in innovative projects, 20% 
mentioned using both in-house and outsourcing, and 5% indicated realizing only in-house or on-
ly outsourcing innovations (Table 1).  
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Table 1.  In-house, outsourcing and hybrid forms of innovation  
in the Italian food companies  
 
Hybrids 
Outsourcing (buy) Total 
No Yes 
 
In-house 
No 
No 265 15 280 
Yes 0 2 2 
Yes 
No 21 31 52 
Yes 8 47 55 
Total 294 95 389 
Source. Author’s elaboration on Unicredit 2007 
 
 
To empirically test our theoretical hypotheses, we use a set of variables presented in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2. Explanatory Variables and Descriptive Statistics. 
Theoretical 
Background 
Hypothesis Variable 
Statistics 
Mean S.D. 
Transaction Cost 
Economics 
H1 
Total amount of R&D expenses 2004-
2006 (000 euro) (a)  
rd_tot 98.24 197.89 
H2 
Being part of a holding/group (a) holding 0.19 0.46 
Participating in a consortium (a) consort 0.07 0.25 
Strategic  
Management 
H3 
Index of market concentration (% 
Turn-over first 4 companies in the 
same sector of specialization) (b) 
c4 34.00 24.40 
H4 Size (number of employees) (a) tot_employ 54.17 92.30 
H5 
Presence of product innovation (a) in_prod 0.43 0.50 
Presence of process innovation (a) in_proc 0.19 0.39 
Resource-Based 
View  
H6 
Percentage of employees dedicated to 
R&D activities (a) 
per_empl_rd 5.53 17.35 
H7 Number of skilled workers (a) skilled_work 29.77 69.67 
 
Age of the firm (year) (a) age 31.47 25.86 
 
Amount of investment in ICT (2006) 
(000 euro) (a) 
inv_ict 0.54 0.58 
Control 
Being a cooperative (a) coop 0.09 0.29 
Presence of export activities (a) export 0.63 0.61 
Capacity of capital accumulation in the 
region of location (index) (c) 
cap_stock 21.72 2.27 
Innovation capacity in the region of 
location (index) (c) 
in_capac 1.10 0.34 
Percentage of public R&D expenses in 
the region of location (c) 
pub_r_d 0.52 0.22 
 
 
Percentage of private R&D expenses 
in the region of location (c) 
priv_r_d 0.54 0.31 
Source.  Author’s elaboration on a. Unicredit, 2007; b. ISMEA, 2009; c. ISTAT, 2010 
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The Empirical Model 
 
A widely used approach to estimate the probabilities of choosing between alternative strategies is 
to implement a discrete-choice model (Masten and Saussier 2002). In this case, the observed in-
novation strategy (i.e. in-house, outsourcing or hybrid form) is considered as an expression of a 
continuous latent variable reflecting the propensity to choose a specific option among different 
alternatives. The generic empirical model related to the company j to choose an innovation strat-
egy s can be written as follow: 
 
(1) sjsjsj XY  
'
'
*    Ss     
(2) 
otherwiseY
YifY
sj
sjsj
0
01 *


  Ss     
where *sjY is the unobservable value of the strategy s for company j (latent variable), sjY is the ob-
servable strategy choice, for s = 1 in case of in-house strategy, s = 2 in case of outsourcing and 
s=3 in case of hybrid form strategy. 'jX is the vector of explanatory variables for company j, s  a 
vector of coefficients for strategy s and sj a vector of unobservable characteristics related to 
company j and strategy s (Masten and Saussier 2002). We can derive the probability that strategy 
s is chosen by company j ( sj ) as a function of the potential explanatory variables (Masten and 
Saussier, 2002):  
 
(3) 
    
)()()0()0()1( ''''
*
sjsjsjsjsjsjsjsj XFXPXPYPYP     
 
where F denotes the distribution function of the unobservable characteristics sj . Different econ-
ometric strategies can be implemented accordingly to the nature of the strategic choice analysed 
and the distributional form assumed for F (Verbeek, 2008). In this case, the decision setting is 
about (1) innovating in-house (making), (2) outsourcing (buying) and (3) using a hybrid form. 
This would lead to a system of (three) equations. The implicit assumption is that the probability 
of making is independent from the probability of buying. But there is a high probability that the 
company likelihood to operate in-house is conditional to the decision whether or not to out-
source, and/or use a hybrid form. In other words, these decisions are likely to be interrelated. The 
usual alternative would be to estimate a multivariate probit model (see also Pascucci et al. 2011). 
For each choice (in-house, outsourcing and hybrid form), a probit model is estimated and it is 
assumed that the error terms for the two equations are correlated.  
 
As presented in Pascucci and colleagues (2011), the multivariate probit model is suitable to de-
fine company decisions to choose more than one strategies simultaneously (Greene 2008). Since 
the outcomes are treated as binary variables any combination of strategies is possible. The strate-
gies can be complements rather than substitutes only. The three equations model (one for s = 1, 
one for s = 2, and the other for s = 3) is featured by correlated disturbances, which (due to identi-
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fication reasons) are assumed to follow a normal distribution (variance is normalized to unity). 
That is for each j
th
 company: 
 
(4) 
      0321  jjj EEE           
   
   123321 ,,cov  jjj         
 
  1var]var[]var[ 321  jjj          
 
where is a vector of correlation parameters denoting the extent to which the error terms co-
vary. Should this be the case, we would need to estimate the two equations jointly, following a 
bivariate normal distribution:     ,1,1,1,0,0,0,, 3321  . Because in this model we are inter-
ested in simultaneous strategic decisions we have to define the joint probability. For example, the 
probability of firm j of choosing making and buying strategies at the same time 
 1321  jjj YYY  would be: 
 (5)    
),,(
),,,()1,1,1(
3
'
32
'
21
'
13
32133'
'
22
'
11
'
3321
2 31
jjj
jjjjjjjjjsj
XXX
dddXXXYYYP
j jj


 

  
   
   
 
In this model the log-likelihood is then a sum across the four possible strategies variables (that is, 
four possible combinations of innovate  1321  jjj YYY  and non-innovate  0321  jjj YYY  
times their associated probabilities (Greene, 2003). These probabilities may be drawn from (5) as 
well. The most relevant coefficients estimated in the model are 321 ,,   and )( 123 . The  
latter, if significantly different from zero, will evaluate to which extent each pair of decisions are 
interrelated.  
 
Results  
 
The multivariate probit model results indicate whether the theoretical hypotheses are verified by 
empirical evidence (Table 3, see Appendix). The correlation between in-house, out-sourcing and 
hybrid forms has been confirmed by the results. They indicate that the likelihood that a company 
will jointly consider using in-house, out-sourcing and hybrid forms simultaneously as sourcing 
strategies is positive and relatively high. This result is indeed intriguing from a theoretical per-
spective where often making-buying decisions are seen as alternative rather than complementary 
strategies (see also results from Pascucci et al. 2011). Of course, results refer to joint decisions 
on innovation strategies, which involve different types of innovative projects with different fea-
tures. Therefore, it would be necessary to analyse in more detail the type of innovative projects 
implemented in-house versus out-sourced. 
 
In hypothesis 1 “companies having high investments costs in R&D will favour in-house innova-
tion sourcing”. Results indicate a positive effect of R&D investments not only on in-house strat-
egy, but also on outsourcing and hybrid forms. Therefore, according to these results, the nature 
of R&D investments should not be seen as leading to an increase of asset specificity of the com-

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pany but, more in line with assumption of the dynamic capabilities literature, as a flexible form 
of assets. The companies can make use of the improved R&D capabilities (i.e. due to the finan-
cial resources allocate for their implementation) also to better look at how to outsource innova-
tion or set up a collaborative joint venture with an external research centre.   
 
In the hypothesis 2, we indicated “companies that are part of a holding/group or a consortium 
are more likely to outsource and/or use hybrids”. The variables used to test this hypothesis were 
both not significantly correlated to our dependent variables. Therefore H2 doesn’t hold according 
to our empirical results. Results indicate that in the food industry participation in networks, part-
nerships or alliances targeted to financial activities (holding) or quality and market-participation 
control (consortium) do not necessarily lead to the sharing of innovative projects with those part-
ners. An explanation for these results is linked to the degree of complexity of food innovation 
processes, which requires targeted partners to be implemented in a collaborative form or to allow 
effective outsourcing.  
 
In hypothesis 3, we indicated “companies evolving in high market concentration will be more 
inclined to make innovation in-house”. This is substantially rejected by our results, which indi-
cate a strong negative effect on the likelihood of the firm to implement in-house projects. At the 
same time, results do not indicate any impacts on both outsourcing and hybrid form strategies. 
Therefore, it seems that concentration is discouraging companies to undertake investments in 
internal R&D activities in the food industry. 
 
The variable on the size of the company could not be verified either. Therefore, hypothesis 4, 
which states “the size of the firm has a positive effect on in-house innovation strategy”, doesn’t 
apply to food companies. Our results indicate that SMEs and large corporations do not differ in 
terms of likelihood of innovate in-house, outsource or use hybrid forms.  
 
In hypothesis 5, we indicated that “process innovation is more likely to be outsourced or realized 
through hybrids than product”. Our results partially confirm this hypothesis. While we can high-
light that more process related innovations are more likely to be outsourced, it also applies to 
product innovations. Moreover, it seems that in-house and hybrid form strategies are used in both 
product and process innovation, therefore indicating that a clear-cut relationship doesn’t exist. 
 
Hypothesis 6 states that “companies with a high percentage of employees dedicated to R&D ac-
tivities are more likely to innovate in-house”. Results indicate (per_empl_rd) that this hypothesis 
partially holds and that food companies with higher application of human capital in R&D activi-
ties are less likely to implement outsourcing innovative projects. However, a direct positive ef-
fect on in-house strategies has not been found.  
 
Finally, looking at hypothesis 7, “companies with a higher concentration of skilled workers are 
more likely to innovate in-house and/or using hybrids”, our results don’t confirm this statement 
while indicating a negative correlation between the concentration of skilled employees and in-
house innovation decisions.  
 
In our analysis, we also used a set of control variables, in order to better explain making and buy-
ing decisions of food companies. First, we considered the age of the company. Results indicate 
Pascucci et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 15, Issue 3, 2012 
 2012 International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IFAMA). All rights reserved. 
 
 
111 
that more experienced food companies showed a higher likelihood to innovate through outsourc-
ing activities. Our interpretation is that while older food companies have more accumulated 
knowledge and tacit internal know-how, they are also potentially suffering from routines and in-
ternal procedures which might reduce their likelihood to innovate internally or through collabo-
rative networking. However, longer experience in the operating sector and cumulative 
knowledge create capabilities to use outsourcing strategies that younger food companies might 
not have.  
 
Another result found that companies that invested in information and communication technology 
(ICT) are more likely to both make and out-source innovation. Investments in ICT are basically 
linked to hardware and software technology, which is used in processing food products, manage 
in-bound and out-bound activities, and communicating with other chain partners. ICT technology 
is developed outside the food sector and intensively patenting. Therefore, food companies devel-
op networks of collaboration where ICT-companies are less strategically involved. In contrast, 
ICT technology is more likely to be acquired from the market and internally adapted to compa-
ny-specific problems.   
 
Our results show that being an exporter-oriented company is positively affecting in-house strate-
gies. Adaptation to foreign costumers’ requirements and preferences is the main issue for food 
exporting companies. This requires a highly targeted innovative process, which may lead to in-
ternalize R&D activities more than making use of collaboration or buying technologies on the 
market.  
 
Among the control variables we used to test the role of location and local interactions, only the 
index of the capacity of capital accumulation in the region of location has showed a significant 
correlation. Food companies located in area with higher intensity of investments are less likely to 
make innovation in-house but this situation does not necessary lead to more outsourcing strate-
gies. It means that food companies do not fully benefit from a better environment for implement-
ing innovative strategies. It also indicates that internal factors seem to be more relevant than ex-
ternal ones.  
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Starting from empirical findings in Pascucci and colleagues (2011), and in line with previous re-
searches on innovation in the food sector, this paper investigates the strategies used by food 
companies to innovate. Namely it analyses whether using in-house, out-sourcing or hybrid forms 
of innovation strategies are interrelated, and which driving factors can explain them. We identify 
a set of research hypotheses and use the empirical data to test them. However, empirical results 
highlight that only some of the theoretical statements can be confirmed.  
 
The main finding of this paper is the idea that companies do innovate using interrelated strate-
gies. In-house activities, out-sourcing, and usage of collaborative networks and\or joint ventures 
are part of a more general innovative attitude (capability) of food companies. However, identify-
ing specific factors affecting those decisions remain puzzling, as already highlighted in previous 
papers dealing with the same topic (see for example Pascucci et al. 2011). The general picture 
that emerges from this analysis is that the behaviour of food companies in terms of internaliza-
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tion and externalization of innovation is less differentiated than theories could predict. Another 
important aspect is that the control variables related to the external environment in which the 
company operates were less significant than expected. In the first case, we can highlight the rele-
vance of a synergistic relationship between internalization, pure and mixed outsourcing strate-
gies. In the second case, it could be argued that the context is less relevant than expected a pri-
ori. 
 
The set of results indicates that it is complex to conceive and implement strategic actions and 
policies to stimulate and foster innovation processes in the Italian agro-food sector. In any case, 
our results indicate the need to establish a theoretical analysis more grounded on empirical find-
ings. In particular, the results indicate the need to further test the validity of some theoretical el-
ements such as the ability of companies to learn from other partners (absorptive capacity) and 
their ability to adapt to different socio-economic and institutional contexts (adaptive capacity).  
 
Food managers and practitioners are aware that, although innovation is a key-element for suc-
cessful businesses, it might also be extremely uncertain and complex to organize, especially in 
the food sector. This leads to the conclusion that food managers might have a risk-averse atti-
tude, and therefore opting for “black or grey” as opposite to “black or white” options. Many food 
companies cannot cope with the high stakes imposed by innovative behaviour. They prefer 
“black” options, therefore staying out of innovative strategies and acting as laggards, or late fol-
lowers. When they go for an innovative strategy, they have the tendency to combine in-house 
and external activities (grey options), no matter if they are large corporations or SMEs, coopera-
tives or investor-owned companies, belonging to a holding or a consortium of companies. 
 
The results indicate that a clearer understanding of this decision-making process can be achieved 
either through the analysis of the specific innovative projects, therefore moving from a company 
to a project level, or from an active engagement of managers in experiments and longitudinal 
studies. On the one hand, project-level research can reveal whether in-house decisions are linked 
to more risky projects, or to incremental rather than radical innovations. Moreover, it can indi-
cate whether collaborations are linked to open or closed innovation processes and whether they 
imply complementarities or similarities among partners. On the other hand, experimental settings 
and longitudinal studies can allow researchers to test for risk-aversion behaviour. We believe this 
is a solid ground for building further research on this topic.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 3. Results of the multivariate probit model (MVP) 
Theoretical 
Background 
Hypothesis Variable   In-House 
Out-
Sourcing 
Hybrids 
Transaction 
Cost Economics  
H1 
Total amount of 
R&D expenses 
2004-2006 
rd_tot 
  
0.0041*** 0.0040*** 0.0037*** 
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) 
H2 
Being part of a 
holding 
holding 
-0.0485 0.114 0.4609 
(0.2410) (0.2494) (0.3130) 
Participating in a 
consortium 
consort 
-0.1314 -0.0655 0.1675 
(0.3923) (0.4148) (0.4497) 
Strategic  
Management  
  
H3 
  
Index of market 
concentration±  
c4 
-0.0087** 0.0007 -0.0064 
(0.0044) (0.0040) (0.0051) 
H4 
Size (number of 
employees) 
tot_employ 
-0.002 -0.0031 0.0021 
(0.0044) (0.0052) (0.0044) 
H5 
  
Presence of prod-
uct innovation 
in_prod 
  
0.7289*** 0.4730* 0.5748** 
(0.2042) (0.2012 (0.2573) 
Presence of pro-
cess innovation 
in_proc 
0.4646* 0.8048*** 0.6059** 
(0.2476) (0.2422) (0.2787) 
Resource  
Base- view 
  
H6 
% of employees 
dedicated to R&D 
activities 
per_empl_rd 
-0.0056 -0.0163** -0.0058 
(0.0056) (0.0067) (0.0079) 
H7 
Number of skilled 
workers 
skilledwork 
-0.0117* -0.0112 -0.0101 
(0.0066) (0.0072) (0.0076) 
Control 
Age of the compa-
ny 
age  
-0.0006 0.0082** 0.0053 
(0.0040) (0.0033) (0.0044) 
Amount of invest-
ment in ICT 
(2006) 
inv_ict 
0.0036*** 0.0019* -0.0002 
(0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Cooperative coop 
-0.0886 -0.5428 -0.4849 
(0.3743) (0.4200) (0.4785) 
Presence of export 
activities 
export 
0.2709* 0.0437 0.3001 
(0.1541) (0.1672) (0.1881) 
Capacity of capital 
accumulation in 
the region of loca-
tion 
cap_stock 
-0.1573*** -0.0346 -0.1696** 
(0.0597) (0.0545) (0.0840) 
Innovation capaci-
ty in the region of 
location 
in_capac 
  
-2.6928 -0.4669 -4.0125 
(2.0688) (2.0462) (2.8471) 
% of public R&D 
investment  in the 
region of location 
pub_r_d 
1.9568 0.5637 3.2669 
(1.9711) (1.9425) (2.6643) 
% of private R&D 
investment in the 
region of location 
priv_r_d 
  
2.5461 0.51682 3.0088 
 
(2.2036) (2.1771) (2.9022) 
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Table 3. Continued 
Constant cons 
2.4085 -1.1897 2.1778 
(1.500) (1.4130) (2.1131) 
Correlation between in-house and out-sourcing  r12 
   0.8135***     
(0.0785)     
Correlation between in-house and hybrids  r13 
0.8070***     
(0.0813)     
Correlation between out-sourcing and hybrids  r23 
0.6717***     
(0.0945)     
McFadden R2 = 0.4743 Number of obs.   =  347 
Wald chi2(42)  =  128.28 Log likelihood =  -233.11711    Prob > chi2  =  0.0000 
Likelihood ratio test = 0: chi2(1) =  83.4562   Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Note. ±% turn over first 4 companies in the same sector of specialization 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% level 
 
 
 
 
